Introduction
Evaluation of policy instruments is widely recognized as a valuable tool to inform policy design. Among the variables that influence the evaluation of a policy intervention, the extent to which its effects persist over time and spill across contexts plays an important role. For example, a key question in the environmental economics literature is whether interventions that foster pro-social norms in the conservation of a specific environmental resource have positive or negative spillovers to other pro-environmental behaviors (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015; Truelove, Carrico, Weber, Raimi, & Vandenbergh, 2014) .
The sign and magnitude of policy spillovers may depend on the instrument used to induce behavioral changes. Here, we focus on two instances of nudges, defaults and social information, and two instances of push measures, rebates and a minimum donation rule. Previous research has investigated the effect of defaults (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) , social information (Bryan & Test, 1967; Reingen, 1978) , rebates (Andreoni & Payne, 2011; List, 2011) , and regulation (Cardenas, 2004; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006) in several contexts. Previous studies have also compared the effectiveness of pairs of policy instruments (Ito, Ida, & Tanaka, 2015; Ferraro & Price, 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera, & Jack, 2014) .
However, little is known about how treatment effects would carry forward and outside the specific area they were designed for (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study comparing all these interventions within the same design both in terms of their direct effect on a Dictator Game and in terms of their ability to influence subsequent behavior within the same decision context (i.e., other Dictator Game) and across contexts (i.e., Prisoner's Dilemma).
Experimental design and procedure
We implemented a large scale experiment articulated in two stages in Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), using a pool of US workers. Overall, we recruited 1,486 participants: 738 as decision makers and 748 as recipients. From the sample of recipients we elicited beliefs on behavior of decision makers in the main experiment 1 .
Subjects received $0.50 as participation fee, in addition to the earnings from the tasks. They participated 1 We also conducted a pilot study with 564 participants, consisting in a single DG with two treatments, differing in the size of the participation fee ($0.50 and $0.70) . Pilot data are used in the social information treatment and to check for the presence of income effects in DG donations (see Section 3).
in a first stage DG (half in the role of dictators and half in the role of recipients), and subsequently played a second game, randomly chosen between another DG and a PD. Subjects playing a second DG kept the same role as in Stage 1. 2
In the first stage, dictators had an endowment of $0.20 and were asked to decide how much of it (in steps of 2 cents) they wanted to give to the recipient, if any. The recipient had no choice and only got the amount that the dictator allocated to her.
After reading the general rules of the dictator game, all subjects were asked two comprehension questions about the donation maximizing their own and the other participant's payoff. Subjects failing the comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Those who passed the comprehension questions (about 73% of the total) were randomly assigned to one of four different policy interventions, in addition to the baseline case.
As specific policy interventions, we implemented two instances of nudges (default and social information) and two instances of push measures (rebate and minimum donation rule), all of which with a focal donation point at 50% of the endowment. In the default case, donations were pre-set at 50% of the endowment by simply pre-marking the button corresponding to a 50% donation. This is a mild intervention, since the player could select a different donation with very limited effort. Under the social information treatment, we informed subjects of the behavior of the subjects who participated in the pilot study: in particular, subjects were told that roughly half of the previous donations were equal or above 50% (this was the actual outcome, no deception was used). The rebate treatment rewarded dictators who gave at least 50% of their endowment, by returning half of the donation to them. Finally, a minimum donation rule, set at 50% of the endowment, meant that dictators were not allowed to proceed if their donations were strictly below 50%.
The second stage game was either a standard DG or a PD, without any policy intervention. We clarified that the second stage was independent from the first one and played with a different partner. The instruction screen of the second stage DG was identical to the one of the first stage DG, thus no additional comprehension questions were asked. Subjects playing the PD in the second stage had an endowment of $0.10, and were asked how much of it, if any, they wanted to give to the other person (in steps of 1 cent). The amount given would be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other person. Since the Prisoner's 2 Full experimental instructions are reported in the Appendix.
2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Dilemma is different from the Dictator Game, subjects assigned to playing it were asked another set of comprehension questions (success rate of 70%).
While the DG is used to measure individuals' altruistic tendencies (Brañas-Garza, 2006 , 2007 Charness & Gneezy, 2008; Engel, 2011; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016) , the PD is used to measure individuals' cooperative tendencies (Nowak, 2006; Perc & Szolnoki, 2010; Capraro, 2013; Rand & Nowak, 2013) . Recent experiments have shown that Dictators' allocations are positively correlated with real life altruism in a number of situations (Franzen & Pointner, 2013; Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014) . The PD is a reliable measure of cooperative tendencies (Englmaier & Gebhardt, 2016) . Although positively correlated, altruism and cooperation are two different types of behaviors : Capraro, Jordan and Rand (2014) have shown that people who give in the DG also cooperate in the PD, but not the converse 3 .
All subjects participating in the main experiment completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of the second stage. Table 1 summarizes our treatments, and displays the number of participants for each of them. We adopted a series of checks on IP addresses and Turk IDs to ensure that no subject took the experiment more than once. The sample size in the second stage PD is smaller than in the second stage DG, because of the 30% of subjects assigned to this treatment who failed the additional comprehension questions on the PD (same success rate of the common set of questions). However, this differential attrition has not led to statistically significant differences between the two sub-samples along observable characteristics, as shown in Table 1 in the Supplementary Material.
For DG games, we recruited an equal number of subjects to act as receivers. Subjects assigned to the role of receivers in the main experiment faced two belief elicitation tasks. In each treatment, subjects were grouped with two other participants, person A (a dictator) and person B (a recipient). They were shown the screenshots of the instructions received by person A, and were asked to guess person A's donation to Person B. Stage 1 treatments mirrored the ones facing the dictators. Correct guesses were incentivized with a $0.20 reward. This design allows us to elicit recipients' beliefs (Capraro & Kuilder, 2016) and to observe if beliefs on DG donation in stage 1 and 2 varied between subjects depending on how giving was encouraged in the first stage game. Linear regressions show that setting a default does not significantly increase Dictator Game donations, while all other policy interventions have a significant positive effect on donations, although the effect of social information is only marginally significant (Column 1 of Table 2 in the Appendix). Pooling together nudge and push measures, we find that only the latter have a significant positive effect on donations (Column 2 of Table 2 in the Appendix)
We also observe that out of pocket donations by dictators in the baseline treatment and those in the rebate treatment are statistically the same, as the increase in donations in the rebate treatment turns out 6 3.1 Direct effects 3 RESULTS 
Spillover effects 3 RESULTS
to be entirely paid by the institution. Precisely, subtracting the rebate from the actual donation, we find an average donation of 23.5% of the total pie, which is not statistically different from the amount given in the baseline (rank sum, p = 0.249). On the one hand, this shows that, in our experiment, rebates do not crowd out intrinsic motivations to give; on the other hand, this also shows that rebates do not increase net donations.
Spillover effects
Dictator Game
Moving on to the analysis of spillovers from Stage 1 Dictator Game to Stage 2 Dictator Game, Column 2 of 
Subjects' guess of treatment effects
One potential explanation for the lack of direct and spillover effects of nudges is that our treatment manipulations were too weak. To address this issue, we ask whether individuals detect these interventions and correctly predict the observed effects. Figure 1 reports people's beliefs for each of the treatments, and provides visual evidence that they are not always accurate.
Subjects' guess of treatment effects 3 RESULTS
More in detail, comparison between baseline and treated beliefs shows that people incorrectly predicted a positive direct and spillover effect of the default treatment (see Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 3 in the Appendix). Regarding the social information treatment, subjects correctly predicted the existence of a direct effect, but incorrectly believed in the presence of a positive spillover effect (see Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 3 in the Appendix). These results on beliefs, especially the one about the default policy instrument, are reassuring, as they demonstrate that the design of these treatments was not as mild as to make them undetectable. Finally, observers correctly guessed the presence of direct effects of traditional interventions and their capacity to spill over (see Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 3 in the Appendix).
Pooling nudges and push measures together, we find that observers overestimated both the direct and the spillover effects of the former, while correctly predicting the existence of direct and spillover effect of the latter (see Column 2 and Column 4 of Table 3 in the Appendix) 4
Figure 1: Observers' guesses across treatments 4 The data on beliefs, while giving us a sense of the sign of the effects, does not allow us to say whether subjects correctly guessed also the magnitude of these effects. The main reason is that our experiment is based on a between-subjects design and we do not have a measure of untreated beliefs and donations for treated subjects. Quantifying the biases in beliefs, relative to the observed treatment effects on donations, would require a within-subjects design, where data on both donations and beliefs were collected for each individual.
We investigated whether and how spillovers of altruistic behavior depend on (i) the type of policy instruments used to foster behavioral changes, and (ii) the behavioral context in which spillovers are measured.
Results show that, at least with our choices of policy interventions and contexts, push measures (rebates and minimum donation rules) are more effective than nudges (defaults and social information) in fostering DG giving directly, and in generating positive spillovers in terms of higher giving in a subsequent game, but only within the same context. 
Appendices A Tables

Recipients
The first, the second, and the fourth screens were the same across conditions: and will really make a choice. No deception is used. You will really get the amount of money you decide to keep plus twice the amount that the other participant decides to transfer to you.
Screen 2. Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and you will not get any payment.
Screen 3. How much should YOU transfer in order to maximize YOUR bonus? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 4. How much should YOU transfer in order to maximise THE TOTAL BONUS bonus (i.e. the sum of your and the other participant's bonus)? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 5. How much should THE OTHER PARTICIPANT transfer in order to maximize THE TOTAL bonus (i.e., the sum of your and the other participant's bonus)? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 6. How much should THE OTHER PARTICIPANT transfer in order to maximize THEIR bonus? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 7. Congratulations! You have passed all comprehension questions. It is now time to make your choice. How much do you want to transfer to the other participant? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
